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FOREWORD
Information Service for Officers was established by the

Chief

of Naval Personnel in 1948. It contains lectures and articles of

professional interest to officers of the naval service.

The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are

those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Navy

Department or of the Naval War College .
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"POLICY" IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
A lecture delivered by
Dr. Henry M. Wristonat the Naval War College
May 23, 1950
Occasionally it is desirable to take the mind off the instant
oblem
· in order. to consider broader and more general questions;
pr
the current puzzle is sometimes easier to solve after it is looked at
in a longer perspective.

When this is done successfully it changes
the scale of daily events and makes it possible to view them with
more detachment and see them in their relationship to values which
are permanent.

In an attempt to do something of that kind I wish to discuss

what we really mean by "policy" in foreign affairs.
we are faced with a problem in semantics.

At the outset

The language of

diplomacy, at least until the Russians revised international manners,
has been formal in style and notable for understatement.

It is not

infrequently equivocal in expression. The reason. is simple: anyone

executing diplomatic maneuvers must have in mind the possibility

of failure and must prepare in advance a way of retreat in order to
save face; if prestige is maintained, it is possible to return to the

encounter when arguments have been refurbished, military and

other dispositions re-arranged, and when the chances of success are

· more favorable.

In dealing with

basic

policy, however, "diplomatic" language

should never be used. Meaning should be crystal clear; therefore,

policy is best expressed in naked terms. An illustration from domes
tic life will clarify the point.

When nullification threatened the

A prominent educator, historian and author, Dr. Wriston is now serving
as president of Brown University in Providence, R. I.
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Union, President Jackson reduced fundamental policy to a brief
phrase in his classic toast: "The Federal Union:. it must be pre
served.'' That was a definition of the problem in terms so clear, so
explicit, and so simple that it was impossible to· confuse the issue.
When adjustment, which had been tried earlier in the Mis
souri Compromise and was tried again in 1850, failed to resolve the
conflict and the States were brought to the verge of war, Lincoln re
stated the Jacksonian policy in language equally clear and perhaps
even more explicit. In a letter to Horace Greeley he wrote: "If I
could save the Union withoutJreeing any slaves, I would do it; and
if I could do it by freeing all the slaves!, I would do it; and if I could
save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also
do that."
He succeeded, in those few words, in separating the central
issue-the preservation of the Union__:from the confusing emotional
tensions arising frotn the problem of slavery. . In the Second In
augural he again re-stated the issue with such matchless clarity that
Charles Francis Adams, Jr., wrote his father, our Minister in Lon
don: "That rail-splitting lawyer is one of the wonders of the day ....
This inaugural strikes me in the grand simplicity and directness as
being for all time the historical keynote of this war."
It is one of the major tragedies of our time that no such lucid
summary of the meaning of the recent world war has come from
any statesman. It is a measure of our confusion that it is asserted
from time to time that no such valid and clear pronouncement could
be made because of the incoherence which the Russian alliance·
brought in its train. This is not true. If one has any grasp of
historical fact, it must be clear that the Russian -alliance brought no
more complications than the slavery issue brought to the War be
tween the States. Lincoln was able to put in words which a child
2
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could understand the reason for war. In similar fashion the basic
policy beneath American participation in both world wars of the
20th century is just as simple; any schoolboy could grasp it. It is,
explicitly, that the interests of the United States are so world-wide
that it could n0t permit any aggressor nation to control the whole
continent of Europe-or for that matter Asia.
That is the complete and adequate explanation of our par
ticipation in both wars. It is also the complete and adequate explanation of our delay in entering both wars. Our basic interest is
real and vital, but it is neither so immediate nor so vital as the like
interests of Britain and France. As long as there was reasonable
basis for the belief that Britain and France could win alone, or with
moral and material help from us, or assistance short of force, there
was adequate reason to al;>stain from fighting: When it became
clear that the risk of their defeat was too great and, therefore,
our own policy was genuinely imperiled, we went in. It is not nec
essary to assert that the timing was accurate in either case. The
point is that delay in participation was� not irrational. As funda
mental policy explains our entrance into the world wars, it equally
explains our part in the "cold war"; the fact that victory in two
world wars did not avoid the cold war does not invalidate the
reasoning.
When one looks at foreign policies, therefore, there are
many which can be put in phrases just as clear and just as brief·
as the Jacksonian policy with reference to the Federal Union. The
classical British doctrine, the Balance of Power, illustrates the
point. Our twin policies of the Open Door in China and the in
tegrity of China are other illustrations. If one reflects upon those
fundamentals with which we are concerned this morning, it will be
perfectly obvious that they can be more effectively implemented
and more successfully carried out when they are reduced to plain,
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naval war with France and the War of 1812 with Britain. But it
could not emerge as a very significant policy until all the world

recognized us as a. world power, and it could not become a funda
mental policy until we were recognized as the Western power
the anchor man in that power group.

We have the- same sort of fundamental policy with regard

to Asia.

Of course, we had no basic Asiatic policy for many years

because we did not face the Pacific and Asia was not a factor in
world affairs., But once we touched the Pacific it is extraordinary

how speedily men who have no claims to great statesmanship per
ceived the reality of our interest in that continent. Thus as Asia

came into the focus · of international aff'airs and as we rose to the

stature of a world power, the policy of no single dominant power

in Europe had to be matched by a policy of no dominant power in

Asia.

It found expression in two classical phrases-the Open Door

in China, that is resistance to economic imperialism, and the In
tegrity of China, or resistance to political imperialism.

It is essential to recognize the extraordinary stability of

basic policy.

The ebb and flow of circumstances over those un

derlying realities must occasion many tactical maneuvers in the
effort to make policy effective, but that does not mean a new policy.
The Integrity of China, for example, is still valid.
many vicissitudes.

It has suffered

As a policy it was never fully achieved; but, if

one understands its fundamental character and appreciates how long
it was in maturing, it becomes · equally clear that it is not yet com

pletely, or permanently, defeated. Its current eclipse is nothing to
be happy about, but neither is it anything to despair over.
Thus when we draw policy into its time perspective it be

comes clear that most so-called "new'' policies are transient; that
is because they violate a third quality which
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should have.

It should be not only clear and stable, but free of

passion and emotion; it ought to be a strictly intellectual construct
framed from real and permanent interests and utterly devoid of

heat.

Of course, once it has come to definition and its status is

determined it may be, in fact it must be, defended with fervor. But

what Jackson showed in his toast and Lincoln demonstrated in the

War between the states, Washington had defined in his Farewell

Address; he emphasized the objectivity of proper policy when he .

spoke

against

tipathies."

"passionate

attachments"

and

"inveterate

an

Thus the so-:ealled "Morgenthau policy" for Germany was,

it seems to me, not a policy at all; it was just a reaction under ·

emotional stress; it overlooked geography, mcperience, tlie talents

of a people, strategical concepts, and the psychology of both Ger
mans and Americans. It was, therefore, transient.

It was also disastrous, because it exemplified a characteris

tic modern error-.:the belief that the opposite of som�thing bad

must be somethng good, which is not true.

By destroying not only

__

German dominance but German power completely, protection is not

achieved; it may lead, as the Morgenthau proposal did, to a power

vacuum and thus draw in another nation (in this instance Russia)

until it tl}reatens to replace the beaten nation as the dominant force
in Europe.

The consequence may be a situation no less intolerable

than that which was overcome by war.

The policy of destroying all German power-economic, pol

itical, and military-was emotionally oriented.

The war checked

Fascis� and Nazism, but the exhaustion of .the West offered to

Russia an opportunity to attempt something which was contrary

to our interest. Only slowly did realization dawn that an emotional
response was likely to defeat our own policy by making us think

6
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of Germany in negative terms only and misconceive Russia in posi
tive terms, often sentimentally. This attitude can be summed up
in the phrase, "Good old Joe," now happily relegated to the realm
of myth.
In the fourth place we should remember that the word
"policy" should be reserved for the things which are fundamental
and continuous and should not be applied to devices and tactics,
however important they may be. - It is a mistake, for example, to
refer to the Marshall Plan as basic policy. It is an extraordinary
important operation, but nonetheless essentially a tactical device
in support of our basic policy of preventing a single aggressive power
from encompassing Europe. It is, therefore, a means to a larger
end. It is, as we know, a transient means, for, by its own terms,
it is to end in 1952. It has all the elements of ingeniousness that
any brilliant tactical maneuver should have; it involves the con
structive use of economic power to buy time for the re-creation and
re-organization of forces likely to hold Russia in check. Its success
or failure must be judged upon those considerations.
It certainly has bought time. I do not think anyone seri
ously believes that the Italian Government would be constituted
as it is today without the Marshall Plan or that the Greek Govern
ment would be constituted as it is today but for Marshall aid. There
is now before us a novel and bold suggestion-the Schuman pro
posal for the integration of the coal and steel industries of France
and Germany. That proposal would have been incredible if either
DeGaulle or the Communists had been in contro.l of France. If the
Third Force had not been perpetuated in power by external support,
that dramatic program for strengthening the economic defenses of
Western Europe would never have been proposed.
Whether progress toward the re-organization of Europe is
complete enough or swift enough is a matter of judgment. Current
RESTRICTED
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spicuous by its absence in China. We, therefore, had no channel
through which our policy could flow. General Wedmeyer also came
to that conclusion and said, in effect, that

if we

wanted to be sure

to stop the Reds we must supply the personnel and make the full
commitments; otherwise we must let nature take its course for a
time because he saw no hope of making an effective instrument of
Chiang Kai-shek.

Somewhat the same problem has confronted us in Greece;

we have had to work with what is there. The letter, which Am
bassador Grady wrote to the Premier of Greece on the first of

April, makes it clear that what we have had to work with in that
country is. not very good; he made a bold and tactically dangerous
move to. improve it. This is what he said: "The effort to make

Greece self-sustaining and independent of foreign aid .... has
hardly begun ....An important reason for the · delay has been a
r
less than satisfactoy performance by the Greek Government in its
conduct of economic affairs.Only twenty-seven months remain in

which the Greek Government may take advantage of the American
aid made available through the Marshall Plan. This short time
permits no further delay ....The American people, however, are

entitled to expect, and do expect, that any Greek Government
which hopes to continue to receive the aid which they have gen
erously offered, will utilize this assistance to the fullest degree.
"In my opinion, only a stable and efficient Government SUP
ported by the people and by Parliament will be able to act with

courage and the firmness of long-term policy which are essential

to the wise use of the aid offered by the American people. Irre

sponsible talk of adjourning Parliament or of new elections before
th.e new Parliament has had an opportunity to rise to its responsi

bility, can only create a climate of political and economic uncer

tainty which may do grave damage to the country's future ....
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Only a Government which can secure and . maintain public confi

dence by its boldness and by its devotion to the public interest can

be expected to execute the reconstruction stage of Greek recovery.

We earnestly hope the Greek Government will meet this challenge

. . . . It is in the hands of the Greek Government and the Greek

Parliament to decide whether or not they wish to continue to re

ceive American aid and hence to accept the responsibilities which
will attain its purpose.

It is .the obligation and intention of the

American Government with regard to all Marshall aid countries to

decide whether or not the performance of the recipient Govern
ment, whether Greek or any/ other, justifies a continuance of the
aid on the scale heretofore contemplated."

When one has read the letter and realizes that it is usually

bad tactics to interfere so openly in · the domestic politics of a·
foreign nation, both the boldness and the dangerousnes,s of the
mo've become clear.

It suggests the situation was so serious that

only a drastic remedy was worth trying. It also highlights how a

sound· and necessary policy may fail temporarily ( and the word ·
"temporarily" must sometimes be given a very flexible interpre

,,

tation) for want of adequate, cooperating partners.

11

11

The sixth aspect of basic policy in this review is that suc

cess or failure at any given moment is affected by the quality of

our own management. Americans in times past were proud of our
"shirt-sleeves diplomacy," which in some circumstances was well
adapted and worked satisfactorily, and in other circumstances was
hopelessly bad.

There have been at times amazing deftness and

finesse, great perception and skill, and at other times, stupidity

and lack of stamina.

As a sound strategic concept can fail for want of energy

ari.d for many other reasons, so a policy which is entirely valid

10
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can be under-played, as the Monroe Doctrine was from time to time
when we were not alert enough in the defense of its principles;
it can be over-played, also, as Olney did in the Venezuela case.
Neither the under-playing nor the over-playing affects the valid
ity of the basic concept. The Monroe Doctrine does not represent
a geographic reality, for the Western Hemisphere, except physi
cally, is pretty much a myth. Certainly it is not culturally valid.
Nonetheless politically it is sound, and even the failure of Latin
America to develop along the democratic lines that the Anglo
Saxons believe are correct, while it causes difficulties, does not
make the fundamental concept less valid. It must be said that so
far as the Monroe Doctrine is concerned our successive Secretaries
of State, since we became a world power, have adapted themselves
to the changing scene.
In the seventh place, success of a basic policy does not hang
upon dramatic or critical events. We have practically worn out
the word "crisis" in our time. Modern means of communication
and other factors have led us to over-dramatize the daily event
and to hide the fact that indirect results are often more important
than the immediate result. As George F. Kennan suggested recent
ly in his notable speech in Milwaukee, sometimes five or ten years
elapse between cause and effect in major foreign policy develop
ments. The true meaning emerges only after the sense of crisis
has subsided.
Hitler offers a dramatic example: he told his men that on
their arms rested "the fate of the German nation for the next
thousand years." That was nonsense, because it made transient
circumstances appear too decisive over too long a period. Already
we can see that the German nation, though defeated, is now so
essential to both competing power blocs that we may again see a
repetition of what has happened so often before in history: over
RESTRICTED
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a considerable period of time the defeated nation may profit more
in defeat than it would have profited if it had won the victory.
Hitler's error suggests a common failing. Right now over
dramatization of current events leads us to expect too much of
diplomatic conferences. It.is complained, for example, that the Big
Three communique issued week before last sounded very much like . ·
the one issued nearly a year before. That ought not to be re
garded as necessarily bad. It may well reflect steadiness of pur�
pose, not a mere rushing from one hunch to another.
/

In 1880 one of our basic policies was crystallized by President Hayes, when he said that, "The policy of this country is a
canal under American control .. . . An inter-oceanic canal across
·the American Isthmus will essentially change the geographical re
lations between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United
States ....It would be the great ocean thoroughfare between our·
....shores, and virtually a part of the coast line of the United
States."
The last phrase sums it UP-the canal as "part of the
coast line of the United States." That was as explicit as a policy
could be made. Few people could now tell with any precision why
· that statement came just when ,it did; the crisis which precipitated
the pronouncement has faded. The policy, so plainly and forcefully
stated, remains. It ran counter to the terms of the Clayton.
Bulwer treaty and Hayes' comment was in a sense an announcement.
of the fact and a prediction that the treaty would not survi.ve. the
pursuit of American policy.
Over the years that policy could have been implemeJJted by
any number of actions. At one extreme would have been the an
nexation of everything within that "coast line." There was a

12
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strong drift in that direction for some time. The statement of
Olney that our "fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines
its interposition" was in harmony with such an idea. The Platt
Amendment. for Cuba and tlre putting of armed forces into Haiti,
Santo Domtngo, Nicaragua, and other countries might have
eventuated in military, political, and economic control. At the
other extreme, while the basic policy of regarding the canal as

part .of our coast line remains unchanged, · all our relations with
Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean have been.put upon the
bases of mutuality, with some_ accent upon United States leader
ship, to a degree which Olney's tactics would never have led one
to expect as within the realm of possibility. In short, a shift in
tactics from time to time seen in too short a perspective looks like
a shift in policy, when in reality it does not involve 1:Juch a de
velopment.

This consideration leads to the eighth point. · One of the
central i1:Jsues of recent discussion is bipartisanism. Basic policies
are non-political. That is more accurate than saying bi-partisan. I
think Senator· Vandenberg recently called- them "un-partisan,"
which correctly expresses the point. The Monroe Doctrine, the
Panama Canal as our coast line, Canada as within our defense
system resistance to. control of Europe or Asia by a single power
all these policies would be the same whether the administration were
Republican or Democratic.
On the other hand, the tactical dispositions adopted to

achieve the policies are subject to politics, and properly so.

It is

the essence of the democratic system that action by the party in
power is carried on under the scrutiny and criticism of the.minority.

In England this -is epitomized by the phrase, "His Majesty's loyal

opposition." It is revealed in our government by the fraternaliza
tion across the aisle at one moment and the tension· between the
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two sides at the next.

The opposition almost always has to take

a somewhat negative attitude because it does not have access to all

the current dispatches and information necessary for constructive
judgment.

But even when criticis� is negative, it may well force

those in power to act carefully.

It can be vigorous and occasionally

may be violent, but should be at all costs responsible.

When we

see political opposition in this light, we realize that it is not to be
deprecated, but encouraged; that is the only way in a democratic

society by which the public can hear both sides of every question

and reach a considered consensus.

In times of crisis when there is imminent and serious

danger, opposition is mitigated.

That has been true of the so

called "Truman Doctrine" with regard to Greece and Turkey, true in

connection with the Berlin air lift and the Marshall Plan. Nonthe
less, if the mitigation of opposition is long continued and not

limited to matters under dangerous tension, it leads to a tendency
to regard all opposition as improper.

That feeling is far more

dangerous in many respects than even violent opposition because

it cuts at the root of the responsibility of the majority party and

- destroys the foundations for an informed public opinion.

Consideration of policy in these broader terms indicates in

the ninth place that it must be judged dynamically, rather than by

any static method of estimation.

One recent proposal is that we

draw up a balance sheet to show our assets and liabilities and learn
whether or not we are over-extended.

It is not ari apt analogy,

because policy is never fully reflected in a balance sheet-even
industrial policy.

By its nature the momentum, which is inherent

in the activity of -any organization, is not shown.

In some of our

greatest corporations, the balance sheet has an item: patents, one

dollar. If the patents were really worth one dollar, the organization
would be bankrupt.

If the company did not have the patents, it

14
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would not be in business.

That dollar is merely a symbolic figure;

it is an indication that the value of the patents cannot be esti
mated.

Anyone who has been on an investment committee knows

that the balance sheet does not adequately reflect the kind of man
agement the company has.

The enterprise may be solvent, but

stagnant; management may be vital, but unwise.

Those consid

erations could well be concealed, rather than revealed, on a balance

sheet.

Moreover, the balance sheet, by its very nature, isolates

. the company. It does not show it in relationship to its competitors
or to those cooperating with it.

But an industrial company does

not live in isolation any more than a nation does. Therefore, while

a balance sheet has certain obvious merits, as a basis for estimation
of policy it may be quite misleading.

Let us take, for example, the Monroe Doctrine; on any bal

ance-sheet theory it would never have been drafted by so stern a

realist as John Quincy Adams nor uttered by so seasoned a political
leader as James Monroe.

There were timorous people who felt at

the time that we were over-extending our commitments.

They

wanted us at least to concert our action with Britain; but John

Quincy Adams, one of our really great Secretaries of State, said that

he was unwilling the United States should come in �s "a cockboat

in the wake of the British man-of-war." He could read with amuse

ment, not untinged with irritation, the bombastic words of George
Canning, "I called the New World into existence to redress the bal

ance of the Old," because he knew that statement was not true.

The policy involved in the Monroe Doctrine has been chal

lenged many times and by many powers-Britain, France, and
Germany among others-but we were seldom alone in its defense.
It is not historically accurate to say that it rested upon the power
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of the British navy. From time to time it did so depend to some
extent, but at other times it challenged the power of the British
navy.
What the balance-sheet technique would conceal is that, when
at various times the issue was drawn, there was almost always
some nation with an interest which was parallel to our own over a
short or middle-length period, and that we could count upon assist
ance, direct or indirect. It was not even necessary that our inter
ests should coincide with those of the cooperating power in Latin
America; support might mean no more than a common desire to op
pose the threatening power for wholly different reasons; the ef
fect was to lend help to our policy at the moment of crisis. But
even beyond such assistance there is a fact of first importance,
namely that we always had a greater interest in the preservation of
the Monroe Doctrine than anyone else could have in challenging it.
This leads to the final characteristic of basic policy: not all
policies, not even all basic policies, have the same order of magni
tude or equal priority. We would defend the policy of the Panama
Canal as part of our coast line before we would make war to avoid
dominance of Asia by a single power. Similarly, we mitigated our
support of the Monroe Doctrine in the course of the Civil War be
cause the indissolubility of the Union took priority over the main
tenance of the Monroe Doctrine. The balance-sheet technique con
ceals the fact that our commitments are not uniform over the
whole area of policy and, more particularly, that they are not uni
form at any given moment. Moreover, not all the policies of a nation
are challenged at the same moment. For this reason it is never
necessary to exert all the nation's power behind every policy at one
time ; they tend to be successively challenged-not all at once.
16
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Other nations, some of whose policies parallel our own, may
indeed
must have, different priorities. That no one power
have,
should dominate Europe is American policy; it is also British
policy and French policy. Inevitably it has a higher priority in the
British and French hierarchy of policy than in ours. The same
reasoning applies to aid to Greece and Turkey. Because they were
on her life-line, Britain's interest was more immediate and direct
than ours. Our interest in them was a subsidiary of our determina
tion to let no nation dominate Europe. Only when Britain notified
us that she could not bear the w�ight, and when the Russian threat
was immediate and serious, did we take over the leadership.
Today there is no direct threat to the Canal as part of our
coast line, no challenge to Canada as within our defense system, no
infringement of the Monroe Doctrine; today it is our policy of no
one dominant nation over all Europe or Asia that is being chal
lenged. That fact accounts for the notable shift in our tactical dis
positions, in new political emphases, and in dramatic economic man
euvers; but it does not in any way mean the abandonment of other
policies, nor does it mean that we are over-committed, because
while there is a very heavy threat in one area, there is virtual
absence of challenge in others.
The purpose of this review of the underlying considerations
in foreign policy is to lift our sights from the daily and immediate,
the complex and the confusing. It is designed to help us look at
the broader significance which time and analysis can reveal. The
seriousness of the current situation is abundantly clear. We do not
want even a tactical reverse. Nevertheless no one ever achieves all
his objectives; whether we like it or not we must expect some re
verses because our opponent is strong, resourceful, and determined.
The recent temper of Americans has been one of reacton from the
stimulation of victory; it may well have moved from the over-optimRESTRICTED
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ism that followed triumph to an unwarranted pessimism. Judgment
will be sounder if is founded upon a long-range view.

18
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OUTLOOK FOR WESTERN CIVILIZATION
A
at

lecture

delivered by
C. Hopper
the Naval War College
March 30, 1950

Dr. Bruce

I have cherished so much the privilege of coming to the Naval
War College. I feel like Paul among the Athenians-the Athen
ians were always looking for some new thing. I think the Navy is
that way too. Now I will try to bring out some new ideas here.
What I want to bring out in the first place is time in terms of con
trol of the time table, and not time as distinct from space in terms
of civilization.
It is hard to make revelations about Russia except to repeat
constantly that . there is still darkness in Scythia. I find after
having had six years away from academic life that what measure
of retreat or withdrawal one gets in the academic circle somehow
lengthens the perspective. It may be that the role of professor is
just to find things that are overlooked by the experts.
In my instance what I have been looking for is the some
thing that America once had and has lost. The perspective turns
to western civilization and there are several things which stand out
in my mind. The first is that the Bolsheviks are still completely
convinced that they can last longer than we can in this type of
struggle. The second is that they still control the. time table. The
third is that America's disunity is an aid and comfort to the Bol
sheviks and the despair of our friends. And the fourth is that the
Bolsheviks use time in their calculations as well as space.
Doctor Hopper is Professor of International Relations at Harvard
University and has written several books and articles on Russia.
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Now I know that you have studied a great deal about poli

tics and you will agree with me that timing is the master control

in any program of politics.

one must think of time.

Time must not be overemphasized but

Senator Dixon, one time governor of Mon

tana, used to say that the strange thing is that you go on preparing

and preparing and preparing for something called life, and then

one day yqu awaken to realize that that for which you had been
preparing has already passed you by.

It may be that the dem

ocracies, in facing Bolshevism, go on preparing for a type of strug-

gle that'ma:y never come off: A-bombs, H-bombs, bacteria-all
that.

The struggle might be rather, i� the Russian phrase, a

"kto-kogo" ( ?) .

Who beats who?

Who can outlast the other?

It

may be an attrition not unlike that between the popes and the

emperors for centuries in the Middle Ages.

Obviously all you have to do is read the newspapers or talk

to a Russian to realize that the Bolsheviks are much more confi

dent than we are that they can outlast us.

The reason is that it is

much easier to chop down trees than to replant the forest.

are more time conscious.

We are not time conscious.

didn't give · us much patience here in America.

They

The Lord

We are a speed

people---'-'get it done yesterday-and we want . what we want when

we want it-but quick. Well, in playing chess with the Bolsheviks,

that type of impatience may cost us the queen.

I want to talk about time, always remembering that there

is a tide in the affairs of men, etc.

The totalitarians plan more.

They are compelled to be more time conscious and yet it is surprising
how much help they got from the outside in their effort to gain con

trol of the time table.

In the case of Hitler, for instance, you

can see how the Communists in Germany helped put him in power.

They allied with Hitler against the Weimar Republic.

You can see

how President Roosevelt helped insure Hitler in power by devaluing
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the dollar and thus wi1>ed out 40% of the German debt in 1933,
overnight; how the British gave favorable trade terms; how the
Russians, instead of returning wheat as in the contract for the two
billion . gold marks of machinery supplied by Weimar Germany,
made the payment to Hitler in gold and in armament materials.. The
. outside powers set it up for Hitler and then he went with machine
gun staccato from one point to another after he _had got control of
the time table about 1936, or even 1935.
It was that chronic indecision of the democracies; that in
ability to concentrate on the real enemy. Think of all the gun
ning we did for Mussolini at that time. He could have been had.
There were only a few rocks in the desert-:--a little something on
his chest. He kept telling his people it is better to live one hour
like a lion:than a.hundred years like a sheep. They didn't believe
it. If we had given him a little something we could have kept him
on our side of the fence and the war might have been different.
But in World War II, by the deal with Hitler in August
1939, the Bolsheviks collected loot until June 1941, and were in
abeyance· until· October of 1944 when General Bor put on the up
rising of Warsaw. Our intelligence people say that if they had
kept on coming west the war might have been over the winter of
1944 or 45. But no. The Red Army was diverted into the Danube
to beat the British to Vienna and so. on. From th�n onward, as I
study the records, the Bolsheviks have controlled the time tables.
· At Yalta they determined when they would enter the Pacific
war, for a price. They forced the second ceremony of surrender at
Berlin (after the one at Reims). Thereafter they turned on the
heat and turned it off again, forcing us to put the airlift on Berlin
and deciding when it would cease, the heat on Iran� the heat cm
China, etc., etc. Who controls the time table determines not .only
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the order of events in general, but determines the rules, the prin
ciples, . and the fashions of the period. To control the time table
is to get into the driver's seat.
Now I think that there are a number of requirements. I
would like to cite ten selected areas in which America's indecision
allows the Bolsheviks to keep control of the time table. If we are
going to get control, we have to make up our minds about these
particular areas.
As St. Paul wrote to the Corinthians, "If the trumpet gives
an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to battle?" Well, the
answer is of course, no one. During the war, our trumpet had a
very certain sound. Of course there was a unity of purpose which
has since been squandered, and our danger as a nation is perhaps
even greater now-greater in the long terms of history than it was
when the submarines were at the gates, because this danger has to
do with the rise and fall, not only of nations, but of civilization.
And in the long attrition which I see ahead our shining new weapons
may not even be taken out of their wraps. So long as the Bol
sheviks control the time table, they determine the weapons. And
they don't want a shooting war.
So here are ten suggestions in areas where America is con
spicuous for indecision. The first one: We must have a clear
definition of our relations with the Bolsheviks, a definition upon
which we will agree. Now what is it? It is not war and it certainly
is not peace. But that is exactly what Trotsky said when he
stomped home from the first part of the Brest-Litovsk peace con
ference in January, 1918., He wouldn't sign anything with the Ger
mans. He said, "No war, no peace," and ran back to Moscow. The
old soldier, General Hoffman, was not impressed with that Bolshevik
logic, so he ordered the German Army to unlimber the guns. And
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it was then that Lenin decided there would be peace-at least on

paper. Trotsky's formula of January 1918-no war, .no peace-was
not implemented actually until 1945.
under-no war, no peace.

That is what we are living

So how are we going to define this?

I think we have to de

fine it before we can get out of this trap of indecision. ,Suppose we
call it tentatively-"War-in-Peace".

Now that would 'raise a hue

and cry, I know, but "cold war" is too passive a term. "Cold war''
doesn't denote the pressures:

Acceptance of the phrase "War-in

Peace" might change the psychology of the country and put us

on the rails back to the unity of purpose which has been lost.

Recently Dean Acheson came forth with a new phrase

Total Diplomacy.

Well, that's good.

That denotes action at any

rate, but how about something a little bit snappier than that?

The

phrase came to me in the middle of the night as they often do., I

don't know whether you get up and write them down, but I have

learned to do it, because they are gone in the morning. This phrase
came to me-Jujitsu Diplomacy.

That's a little spectacular I ad

strength to break his own bones.

That's exactly what the Bolshe

mit.

The idea of jujitsu is to force the opponent to use his. own

viks do to us..

They use our own citizens - against us-freedom of

speech, freedom of this anp that. In other words, they use Ameri-_
can privileges to destroy America. Dean Acheson's speech in _Cali
fornia I think was a bit jujitsu.

You know, Seven Pillars of Wis

dom on how to make Bolshevik muscles go backward.

That's

what that speech meant. He knew it wouldn't accomplish anything,
except a roar from Moscow, but it was a jujitsu tactic.

So, .if we

are forced to agree that peace is not around the corner, that a

shooting war is not around the corner, I think it would be_ useful

to accept a formula that would define the exact conditions, some-
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thing like a state of War-in-Peace.. We have no precedence and no
rules for such a relationship.
Last December I was out � Pittsburgh. One of the �hings·
I wanted to see was that battlefield in Monogahela where General
Braddock fought in 1755. It is all grown up with steel mills now.
f reread Francis Parkman to get the story straight. Ge:geral Brad· dock was a very gallant soldier but· knew nothing about· Indians.
.There was shooting from· behind the trees. So he spoke to the Vir
ginians, to George Washington. He said, "Stand out there and fight
like soldiers," and so on. Afterwards he said, "This isn't war. This
is murder." He lost his force, and he himself was wounded and died.
Now it seems to me that the democracies are doing what
Braddock was doing, using the rules and principles of honorable
war against the Indians in America. If we are going·to survive the
long attrition, we have to get rid of the General Braddock notions.
One of the first things to do is to decide on a definition of this
struggle---e. g., War-in-Peace.
Then a second decision. I thiiµt this is tearing us apart-·
this loyalty, security-risk business. The Bolsheviks feel more and
more copfident that all they have to do is wait while we blow our
selves apart. · Students of history have seen all this happening be
fore in Greece and in Rome. And we are seeing it happening to us
�this indecision among the citizens on the question of loyalty and
security. It is not a question of loyalty, actually. It is a qu�_stion
of security risk at the policy level or for classified material.
'

.

But in judging and in charging our citizens, I believe the issue
is·the degree of.tolerance they show for the enemies of our society�
internal and external. In their minds, they are completely loyal and
they may even think they are good security· risks. Many of them
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are frustrated intellectuals. They call themselves liberals-actually
they are to liberalism what Hellenistic was to Hellenic-something
pseudo, subsequent, and Easternized. Many find refuge in the aca
demic profession and there they rest on their morals in a sort of
detached intellectual neutrality., The label is given to those people
I think, by the writer of Revelations: "Because thou art neither
hot nor cold, but lukewarm, I will spew thee from my mouth." I

think these people who are neutral in times of peril will be spewed
from the mouth of history. Even the little peasants of Eastern
Europe have a firmer grasp on history. They say that in times of
crisis, either you sing with the angels or you will be forced to howl
with the wolves. There is no happy middle ground. Now perhaps
the Supreme Court will get us out of this trap. It is bad business
and is getting worse.
The third point of the area requmng decision: What is
the political direction of our country? This is something that will
have to go to a national decision. You and I are living with it.
Economically it involves government spending-the danger of bank
ruptcy. It includes academic folks and service people, and aHthose
on fixed incomes and frozen salaries. We see what has been hap.
pening in Europe. There has been a transfer of power since 1914
from the middle class which ruled for over a hundred years. Power
is transferred from the middle class to the industrial working class.

The middle class is being disposessed by a war of taxes.

This means in Europe, and will mean for us, more and more

people shifted over to government employment, a swelling bureau�

cracy-the bureaucracy then absorbing the intelligensia and taking

on the mentality of trade unionism. The creative instinct then dies.
Who then will bear the torch?

There is a line in Virgil that. says,

"Easy is the descent to Hell�" You can misquote Virgil a little bit

by saying that easy is the descent to mediocrity. As Joseph Alsop
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wrote, "Mediocrity begets mediocrity," whether by the crony sys
tem or however else.

When we stop putting quality into the individual, then we

start making a mass man.
way ahead of us.

In mass men the Bolsheviks are a long

I can say, as a historian, and I have spent most

of my time studying history, when everyone is safe, then no one

is free.

As we move in that direction the time will come when our

Statue of Liberty will drop the torch and merely hold a monkey

wrench.

Security-a monkey wrench!

At any rate, if that process is abrupt then we will have too

few moral leaders in the next generation. If it is gradual and spread

over a number of decades, then perhaps we might train moral lead

ers and be able to pass on to them the mantle so that the standards
will not perish.

That is really the great issue of the welfare state.

And yet at night when you are alone you sometimes can hear

Madame Lafarge with her knitting needles at the foot of the guil

lotine.

It can all happen again because the brutalization of western

man is something that we can't measure in our times.

Now the fourth question: What kind of Germany do we

want? America has not made up her mind.

has a very uncertain .sound.

There our trumpet

Some Americans say, "Let German

bodies defend the Ruhr." Germany's historic role was in the North

Sea, the.cradle of our democracy. Western Germany is now the key

stone of the arch of a third power in defense of the Atlantic sea
board.

Much of our democracy came from German tribal sources.

We can't have it both ways as I see it.

Either we take western

Germany into the western family and promote unification of all
Germany, or we must be prepared to see the Germans accept the

Bolshevik unification on the assumption that they, the Germans, in
time can outwit the Russians.
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the "Times" this morning that they are not going to allow the

Bonn government to have proper representation in the London
I think it is wrong. I think we should override England

meeting.

-the Labor government at any rate-on such things.
hope for Germany is a Franco-German rapprochment.

Our bigger

A friend of mine, just back from Paris, was telling me about

the new 0. E. E. C. headquarters building which these governments
themselves paid for and built on the grounds of the chateau that

formerly belonged to the Rothschilds. They were confronted with
a problem in bringing in the machinery. There was a beautiful line

of trees there,

Now the Bolshevik method would be to say, "To hell

with the trees, get them out!' I must say that the American method
would also tend in that direction.

that way.

But these people did not think

They erected scaffolding and managed with a great deal

of effort to bring in the machinery over the tops of the trees. They

are very proud because that method signifies the spirit in this new
Europe: preserve what is left of beauty and at the same time

achieve something functional and streamlined.

In that new Europe

there is that essential keystone place for Germany.
do?

So what do we

Do we throw Germany to the wolves or . do we. take her in?

The Germans would like to know and we have to make up our minds
soon.

The fifth area is somewhat similar:

Japan?

What do we do about

Asia is, of course, in this process of rebirth and has been

my main subject for study for twenty years. There will be five-year

plans attempted around Asia. As these new states in the southern

zone move forward in nationalism and independence, I rather expect
to see a shift in diplomatic emphasis from Ea�tern Europe.

We are

going to be squeezed out there, and then we will shift our em
phasis over to Southern Asia.

RESTRICTED
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol3/iss7/1

27
30

Naval War College: September 1950 Full Issue

RESTRICTED
Now here is Japan-----0ur special problem! Japan had wQrked
out her old solution with the material at hand-an economic solution�
We stopped it and crushed Japan. So we have to provide something
else or let Japan go the road of China. What are we 1oing to do?
. Are we going to let Japan's industry recover based on a two-way
exchang�raw materials, industrial products, etc. with Southeast
Asia? · That would seem to be our policy.
Le.t us terminate the state of war with Japan. We have more
. ·control out there than we have in Europe. , Especially in General
MacArthur we have a Pro-Consul on a heroic scale. I think we
ought to bring him home and give him a Roman triumph to show
him that his work will be perpetuated and get on with the job so
that we can hold on to Japan.. That should be done soon. Here we
do have master control.
Now the sixth question, which is on a larger scale. Let us
consider whether our crises today involves · Bolshevik expansion
per se or old style Russian imperialism. The Russians in history
have always absorbed their rulers. A number of times a ruler
such as Peter the Great, or Alexan�er the First has made great
effort to modernize the Russians. The process goes on for a while
and then it lapses. ,Russianism re-emerges after· several decades.
Is that going to happen this time? We have had three attempts at
hegemony in Europe-in modern times I mean-French--Louis XIV,
Napoleon; Teuton--Kaiser Wilhelm, and then Hitler� Now comes
Veliki Ross led by the Bolsheviks'. We wilf have to determine
whether this is a -racial thing or purely revolutionary Bolshevism.
What will we be fighting in 20 years? Will it be a type of im
perialism that is ·more Russian than Bolshevik? Or will the Bol
sheviks by that time have taken over an· the satellites · and all of
Asia, and confront us with a revolutionary imperialism. You must
understand that this is a Bolshevik�hate-America campaign. It may
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peter out. We don't know. All l know is that the Russians never
had their day. One faseinating study is to try to discover in ad
vance when they will bring in their brands. Will they revert to
religious, reevangelization, given the freedom to do so?
We can expect a Bolshevik claim for Alaska somewhere along
· the line. They may make it for nuisance value. They'll simply say
thatthe corrupt Tzarist government officials sold Alaska, that it was
never legal, etc., etc., etc. They wouldn't expect to get it back of
course, Jbut just say it for nuisance value. That will come. So in
order to defeat the enemy in a cold or hot war,· we must differ from
them, not in degree but in kind, and understand whether they are
predominantly Russian, Communist, or Bolshevik.
Now the sev�nth question, and I appeal to you as war
riors: Who are our :fighting Allies? Let us pick our Allies and
give them of our substance and our vitality, and let the others
fade.. Let us not permit the false ideas of our peace mongers to in
terfere with this lasting decision in strategy. The :first thing that
strikes us in thinking of Allies, is that our friends of yesteryear
may be our foes of tomorrow. Two good examples are Czechoslo
vakia and China. Conversely, people that we. fought may be our
friends in -strategic bases ·tomorrow-Germany in the west, and
Japan.
Much depends on the ruling group at the time. Italy, for
instance, was with us in the first World War and against us in
the second. Turkey was against us. in the first, but preserved . a
neutrality in our favor in the second. We must seek allies in terms
of these shifting affinities, and then have one criterion. Yes, send
supplies here and there, but consider would we go hunting tigers
with the people in question? Would they climb trees when a tiger
came? Let us have it simple and direct. If we would hunt tigers
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with them, then let's build them up; Our friends include the na
tions in the North Sea area in general, Western Germ�ny, and also
Greece and Turkey. They are tiger hunters and so is Japan. The
Japanese will defend their rice patties. I believe Franc�Spain wiU

fight too. When our strategic thoughts will turn to Spain we will
suddenly find that we haven't been so terribly hostile to Franco
after all. His country will fit into the strategic picture. · There
fore, who are our fighting Allies? Let's decide and hand out our
favors accordingly.
My eighth point concerns our principles. What are they
to be in this type of struggle, this War-in-Peace. They· can't be
haphazard. You in the Navy know that well. The first essential
in regard to our principles is to know the enemy's principles. The
outstanding principle of the Bolsheviks is continuous expansion

without shooting wars. Their justification of that is their defin
ition of popular sovereignty. For instance, they have sixteen union
, republics; and they say that each one is sovereign and each is
equal, at an international conference, to any foreign·· state. There
fore it doesn't lose its popular sovereignty on becoming part of the
glorious Soviet Union. Each Union Republic is considered sovereign
because it has the constitutional right to withdraw. Of course, we
· could prove the illusion of all that. However, this point I want to
make: By popular sovereignty the Bolsheviks have justified a sys
tem of expansion which is without precedent in history.

We will not review the whole list of territories they have

taken since 1939.

You will see . how easy and wonderful it is for

them, and h.,ow we have allowed it all to happen because we didn't
contest them on this method of popular sovereignty.

Start at

this point: the frontiers. That is where popular sovereignty can be
utilized.

Note that in the various frontiers there is a tribal kin

ship with the peoples outside the frontiers. This is utilized by the
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Bolsheviks when it · comes to expansion. The first one that is of
special interest to you in the Navy is the Norwegian frontier. Ex
amine the Arctic coast, the Kola Peninsula to the Atlantic. In that
area live the people of Anderson's fairy tales, the Lapps. I forget
the exact number overall, but they exist in the Russian part, in
.Sweden, and in Norway. In that area is the largest and most val
uable notrhernmost port of the world, Narvik. If they controlled
the Arctic coast, there wouldn't be that convoy trouble around
North Cape again as in the last war. · A Lapps' Peoples Republic
would unite the natives of that northern zone. They would probably
even speak of a Lapp proletariat. They don't have to be consistent,
you see, in putting this thing over.
Another hot frontier with ·a . similar tribal kinship present
is down in Macedonia. I am not quite sure in my mind just what
is a Macedonian. We know that some of them live in Greece, some
in Yugoslavia and some in Bulgaria. I don't know whether there are
any in Albania or not, but the Macedonian movement is always
there. They do have a literary langu�ge of their own. So when
the movement comes, when it is propitious for the Russians to put
the heat on Macedonia, then they will operate out of Bulgaria.
Another interesting area is in Turkey, U. S. S. R. because
the Armenian questions people outside the frontier. Armenia, of
course, in the 13th and 14th centuries was a very powerful state in
the Near East, thus the memory of a glorious tradition. When
the Russians get ready to put the heat on Turkey for control of
the Straits, then a Greater Armenian Peoples Republic · is to be
expected. It is a set-up. The same thing applies to Azerbaijan. The
Azerbaijan people on the Soviet side and the Azerbaijan people on
the Persian side are .of the same Turkish stock, neither Persian or
Russian. The strength of this racial desire or racial coherence is
again an instrument that the Bolsheviks could and would use when
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they get ready to push for the Suez and India. Now note the
relations of China with the old tributary states. Siam as well as

1

Burma fall into a special category. Anything can happen there.
Then in the course of twenty years with this Russian glacier com

ing into the Bay of Bengal on the East and down to the Persian
Gulf on the West, India would be in the pincers.

what we'll see before we ever get to a shooting war.

That may be

So I say, that confronted with enemy principles in. opera�

tion, we must have our principles of our aim;

Let us see how far

the immutable principles of war, so-called, could be applied to a prO'.

longed attrition without shooting.
First-Objective.

The objective in this type of war I have

described is to overcome the enemy's will.to expand through the use
of popular sovereignty without shooting.

That is what he wants

to expand without shooting. Now we must.overcome his will. That

is the objective.

The second principle-,..,.Offensive. That means,,to

contr.ol the time table. A direct idea of offensive is to control the
time· table and take the initiative.

Let us dwell on those two and

leaving aside all the others-economy of·force,·movement, surprise,
etc.,-except for logistics.

My ninth requirement in this War-in-Peace is Logistics-

what to do about matepal production, imports, exports, etc. Logis
tics is a requirement and a principle.

Effective ·preparations. and

decisions must be made to determine the necessary amounts of

supplies and man power to be utilized.

The tenth point, and this is my clinchng thought in this

development, is what interim strategy should we have at • this

time in this War-in-Peace? I arrive at that by giving our in

.terim strategy if we applied just the two first and most important
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principles of war.. I would say that the principle of objectives is the

restoration of the balance of power in Europe. That is our only way

to get back to free wheeling. I don't want to go through the history

of security, from unity to balance of power, to this collective idea,

the universal type under the League of Nations and the U. N., and

to the regional type that we are now working out in the North At

lantic Treaty.

I will say, as a student of history, that I believe that the

only feasible method of the state system, as presently constituted,
is balance of power. That is exactly what we are doing. I think we

have no complaint to find with the State Department.

By the poli

tical means (the North Atlantic Alliance, plus the Franco-German

rapprochment,) the economic means (the ECA) and the military
means, this process is now going on.

Military assistance to gov

ernments of Europe would strengthen their hands against internal
sabotage and destroy the illusion that an aggressor could have a

quick campaign without much bloodshed, as the Germans believed

in 1914 and again in 1939. Above all, while we are arming Europe,

the most important objective is to deny the Atlantic seaboard to

the Russian snorkels. German submarines in two wars came pretty

close to pulling it off. Maybe next time the Russian snorkels, with
German help, might be able to do it.

At any rate, when that

vacuum created by World War II is filled, and Western Europe in

tegrated-at least in a military sense-then, with a Third Power
in existence, the Balance of Power is restored.

Now the second principle-the principle of offensive.

I

will try to give you something new which you can toss back at me.

And I won't be able to defend it.

I think that the offensive is

just as necessary to victory in this type of War-in-Peace as it is in
a shooting war.

Some of you will recall that the French, at the

time of the Battle of the Marne, retreated, dragging their guns
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through the dust. For days they retreated, retreated, retreated.
Finally came the order, "Stand on the hills, south of the Marne.

Point your guns north and get ready to advance." Well, you might

say a thrill went through that army. A psychological change came
over the French after their retreat; retreat and then advance! That
is what I want to see happen to our country.
the

First we must take

offensive in this interim strategy (and it is only interim).
The Russians stalk out of the U. N.

need the U. N.

Let us not forget it.

Let them stay out. They
We must not repeat the

blunder we made during the war, assuming that they wanted a
separate peace.

That was a crowning blunder stemming, I believe,

from the White House.

Let them get the idea that the U. N. is

pointed towards an alliance outside the Iron Curtain.

But let us

not make the mistake of saying that it is useless to _operate with
out the Bolsheviks.

As for the Chinese delegates who are the tar

gets of their fire, if we throw Dr. Tsiang to the wolves we will de
serve very small credit in history.

Keep him on ice and give him

some function until the Assembly meets in September, and then,
who knows, we might be able to run him as a candidate and get a
new Secretary General.

It might be a good idea.

That would be

putting cockleburrs under the saddle of the Bolsheviks.
what I call

fair.

That's

offensive.

Now the offensive we can take in regards to the atomic af

International inspection would mean the end of Bolshevism.

What about those fifteen million or more slave laborers?
simply cannot allow foreigners to run around in Russia.

had their consent to inspection, it would be postponed.

do a lot amongst ourselves.

allies on atomic policies.

They

So if we

But we can

We can at least unify the western
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Next come the offensive in regard to Germany.

Let us

terminate the state of war with all German people-not only West

ern Germany, but Eastern Germany.
making a peace treaty.

It is not yet the time for

The Bolsheviks may go in and perhaps an
We have them in a box now.

We can do

Germany wi�hout making a fifth partition of Poland.

That's our

nex Eastern Germany.

a little jujitsu if we are clever enough.
jujitsu. Let's get on with it.

The Kremlin cannot unify

And immediately what shall we do?

They talk about launching the youths of Eastern Germany into
Berlin in May.

Let's send General Clay back to Berlin. He's the

idol of the German people.

What are we doing with him now?

Why, he-is lecturing at Harvard this week.

There's a bigger job

than that for him.

Send him back there with any kind of cooked

the Germans trust.

It would be a signal to them that we do not

up mission just so he is there in Berlin, because he is a figure that
intend to get out of Berlin. Take the offensive.

Go in and make an offensive in regard to this national com

munism from outside the Iron Curtain-Yugoslavia, China, and
the others.

The State Department has a policy of erosion, I

don't know exactly what it means but it sounds good.

I would say

that the offensive in the Far East should include the termina

tion of the state of war in Japan and building up the economic

answer to Japan through southeast Asia and eventually point to

trade with China so as to get Japan off the taxpayers' neck here

in America. These offensives must be multiplied, using all types

-Point Four economic strategy, etc. My idea is that somewhere
along the line, after we get into the habit, we can take the of
fensive.

time.

I don't mean at the drop of a hat, but to work it out in

As long as we do not take the offensive we will never get

· control of the time table.

If we do take it somewhere along the

line while we are keeping our atoms d:ry, we will awaken one day
to find we have the stop watch and that we are calling the time.
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A long buildup is necessary because our people assume that
an offensive is something wicked and practiced only by aggressors
bent on a shooting war. That isn't true at all. An offensive is the
only way that we can save ourselves from perishing through at
trition and from crumbling within. As an example of our blunder
ing zeal, I could quote the Nuremberg trials. We have got to"get
as far. away from Nuremberg psychology as we possibly can. We
have to adopt a technique we have never met before in history. In
other words, we must call on God to help us. Everything was a liv
ing contradiction in these trials, with the Russians being judges in
their own cause and preventing the Katyn massacre from coming
before the court. I won't cite it, but · I do hope that members of
the college will take advantage of the opportunity to read about the·
Katyn massacre in the report I am leaving here.
Now there is just one more thought. As part of our offensive
technique--our preservation of strength-let us keep our President
at home. By that I mean that every time an American President
has gone abroad, it has brought disaster on Western civilization. It
looks as though the President goes into the camp of the Philistines
and, like Samson, he gets his hair cut when he is asleep. You can
see it in the case of President Wilson for instance. There he was
with his Fourteen Points, the loftiest peace program ever devised
by man. He was sitting pretty. Then ·came the armistice! All he
had to do was to sit still and say, "Here we are., Make your terms
and bring them over to me. I have the Army. I have the Navy. I
have the money. So decide between yourselves and then let me 0. K.
it." Something happened to him in November. I do not know
whether Mrs. Wilson had a yen for Paris or not_. I do know that
the· French Ambassador handed a memo to President Wilson pro
posing· that the victorious Allies not negotiate with the vanquished
powers, but decide among themselves the · terms and then call in
the Germans merely to sign. That was contrary. to Wilson's prin-
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ciples of life. But he simply tossed the thing in his trunk. After
all he was going to Paris, in spite of the fact that Colonel House
said, "Don't Mr. President, don't come to Europe. Stay there in
America."· He went to Paris.
President Wilson landed in Brest and one description which
I read in the French papers said that there hadn't been such a scene
since Julius Caesar set out to conquer Britain in 54 B. C. From
But did he follow Colonel House's inthere he came to Paris.
·,
train, go to the American part
American
junction. to get on the
of the front, speak to . the troops, then fall back to the balcony at
the Embassy in Paris to receive the plaudits of the multitudes and
then get back on the SS George Washington and go home? No!
On the fourteenth of December, the crowd just choked the square
from wall to wall. Here came the .Messiah from the west! And
with Mrs. Wilson in that shining new automobile-well, it was
more than the old Presbyterian could stand. He was just carried
away and he stayed. He lingered there amongst the Philistines
and began to get his hair cut. One by one his points went down
the drain. And in the final analysis, he got his covenant hitched
onto the treaty and he had to agree to all those thing&-the giv
ing away of Shantung, etc., which caused the Senate to toss the
whole thing out of the window.
Looking back, we see that if President Wilson had only
stayed at home and allowed the mountain to come to Mohammed,
history would have been different. Who learned a lesson from
that? Not President Roosevelt, because he used to go over and
have.a·chat with Stalin without taking his long·spoon. Rememl>er?
And so there has been one conference after another. We won't
go into them. We will just say that there was disaster stemming
from Yalta which will perhaps be with the human race for a cen
tury. And then President Truman came to Potsdam. At least he
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put his chop on things. The power of the President is so vast that
we should not allow him to go on the front side of the Statue of

Liberty.

You read in the press, as we are reading now, about other

Presidential trips.

All these people, including even Senator Tyd

ings who knows better, and Churchill, who knows better with his
tongue in cheek, know it is all nonsense.

We have had enough

presidential haircuts to last us for a century.

So I say keep the

President at home as part of this new type of thinking.
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RECOMMENDED READING
For those officers wishing to pursue a course in professional
reading, the Naval War College Reading List is published here
with. The list contains books and articles in many varied fields and
totals approximately 7,000 pages.
I. UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA
"War or Peace"

Dulles ( 1950)

pp
266

This book, autobiographical in nature, is a study of the
present world situation and what might and should be
done about it. Mr. Dulles presents the military struc
ture of the Communist Party and reveals a keen under
standing of its techniques and objectives. As stated
in his conclusion, "If our efforts are still inadequate,
it is because we have not seen clearly the challenge
and its nature". He does much to correct this.
''The Coming Defeat of Comm�nism''

Burnham ( 1949)

278

An appraisal of the workings of Communism and the
optimistic opinion that Communism will be defeated.
The author, an ex-Communist is thoroughly familiar
with the methods and objectives of Communism and
against this background critically examines our con
tainment policy. The premise advanced in an earlier
book, "The Struggle for the World", that we are at war
now with Communism and have been since 1943 is
again proposed. The author's plan consists of recogniz
ing this state of war; determining the objective which
he believes sho�ld be nothing short of the defeat of
Russian-based communist power; and conducting an
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offensive political-subversive war. This type of un
orthodox warfare would consist basically of propa
ganda warfare in all its many ramific�tions. The
author believes that Communism and Capitalism are
irreconcilable. Convincing conclusions are drawn of
the world political scene but the plan of action for the
defeat of Communism is not clearly outlined.
"My Three Years in Moscow"

Lt. Gen. W. B. Smith (1950)

33>

General Smith's report covers his personal and official
experiences and problems as United States ambassador
to Russia from March 1946 to March 1949. It is illum
inating and interesting, particularly because of the
combined_ military and. ambassadorial character of
General Smith.
Pares ( 1949)

21>

A short history of Russia written by the distinguished
Russian historian. The epilogue gives an evaluation
of Russia's internal situation and her position in the
world today.
uThe Price of Power''

Baldwin (1947)

328

A thorough presentation of the political, economic
and military position of the United States and an
inventory of the military strength, new military de
velopments and industrial power of the United States
in relation to other world powers. New world strategy
and .new tactical considerations are discussed. Possi
bilities as to the future course of events are analyzed
in the light of the foregoing.
40
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Abend (1950)

"Ha/.f Slave, Half Free"

pp

291

A veteran newsman's world-wide coverage of the

gloomy Cold War situation as of early 1950. With no

punches pulled he appraises the gains of Communism
and the sp�radic and ineffective short range diplomatic
efforts of the U. S. to curb its growth throughout
the world.

"Blueprint for Wqrld Conquest as Outlined by the Communist
(1946)
International,"

258

The Communist equivalent of "Mein Kampf". A reprint of some original Communist documents in which

they have set forth exactly what and how they plan

to conquer the world.

"ls War with Russia lnevitab.le" (Reader's Digest, March, 1950)

Kennan

9

This article, written by a high official of the State

Department, brilliantly examines the conflict with

Russian Communism and those considerations in

fluencing the commencement of an all-out war. The au-

thor gives us a framework of rather vague generalities
which, if carried out, few will disagree should guide us
successfully through the present "cold war". He con-

cludes that war, although a possibility, is not probable

in the light of an analysis of the future course of
Russia and Russian Communism.

"Sources of Soviet Conduct"

"X"

Foreign Affair-S, July 1947
(Kennan)

17

Concise, hard-hitting evaluation of Russian and Com
munist aims and their determination to overthrow
the West and defeat capitalism.
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t'Slalin on Revolution"

"Historicus"
Foreign Affairs, January 1949

pp
42

An authoritative analysis of Stalin's pronouncements

and of their influence on Communist thinking and
policy throughout the world.

II. WORLD WAR II AND THE FUTURE EMPLOYMENT
OF MILITARY FORCES
t'Modern Arms and Free Men"

Vannevar Bush ( 1949)

264

Dr. Bush scientifically evaluates modern weapons and
assigns them relative importance in a future war.

Moreover he relates the weapons to man's eternal

struggle for freedom from domination by those who
would dominate. He clearly shows why education is a

basic requirement in a democratic system. Throughout

the book the author's deep belief in the ultimate
triumph of men of good will is manifest.

The book is at once significant and authoritative. Pub

lished as it is at the very moment the United States is

preparing to embark on a huge program for .military

defense of Western Europe, its value is inestimable.

For Dr. Bush points out that today defensive weapons
(with some notable exceptions such as the submarine)

appear to be gaining over offensive power. The book
has only one apparent defect. It was written before the

atomic explosion in Russia. The military man who
reads this book (and none can afford not to) will en

counter statements which Dr. Bush might not have
made had he known of the explosion.
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Hessler ( 1949)

pp
274

This important and timely book strikes deep at the

roots of world and national problems and appraises
the factors influencing our national policies today. The

geopolitical,scene, carefully related to our own respon-

sibilities in the world today, is brilliantly examined.
The importance of sea power to us because of our fa

vorable geographic position is carefully delineated to
show its impact in the shaping of a sound foreign pol

icy. Military strategy, as it is being evolved in the

highest councils of government, is critically examined.

Mass destruction area bombing, as a method of conduc

ting strategic air warfare, is strongly attacked from

the standpoint of being militarily unsound and morally
indefen_sible.

The author makes a strong case to discredit the Douhet
concept of .strategic air warfare. However, Mr. Hessler

in no way deprecates the effectiveness of land-based
air. The military advantages open to us as an "island

power" (strategic connotation of the phrase) of exer

cising the offensive capability of sea-air power in any

foreseeable war is enthusiastically developed. Whether
or not one agrees with the emphasis placed on the stra

tegic significance of carrier-based tactical air does not

detract from his conclusion which no student of air·
power can contest: i. e., the heart of air power is com

mand of the air, and further, the fighter plane is the

means of gaining or disputing this ultimate goal.

This book is worthy of concientious study by all mem

bers of the military services. Readers will find exam-
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pies of the author's navy partisanship. However, the
vital problems dealt with are clearly and logically

PP

expressed and analyzed.

"U.S. Naval Logistics in the Second World War"

Ballantine ( 1947 )

308

While the title is very broad, the book confines itself

primarily to a discussion of National and Depart

mental Logistics. In this restricted field the author

makes an excellent analysis of an important problem.

"If Russia Strikes"

Eliot (1949)

252

A discussion of the probability of a war between the

U.S.S.R. and her satellites and the Western Powers,

the character and timing of such a war, the probable

theaters, roles of the various armed forces on both
sides, etc. in the near future.

"Soviet Arms and Air Power"

Guillaume ( 1949)

212

This book recounts briefly the highlights of the mil

itary operations in Germany and USSR on the Eastern

Front during World War II. It contains an analysis
of the factors of Soviet strength, including: the com

mand and administrative structure of the Red Army

and its relationship to the Communist party; factors

of manpower and populations; morale; and the em

ployment of ground and air forces. The most sig

nificant aspect of this book is the treatment given
the war effort of the Soviet economy.

"What Kind of War''

(Atlantic Monthly, July, 1949) Baldwin

20

Hanson Baldwin gives us a refreshing presentation

44

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950

RESTRICTED

47

Naval War College Review, Vol. 3 [1950], No. 7, Art. 1

RESTRICTED
of the all too neglected principle that the determin
ation of . the objective is the first step in the prep
aration for war. He then discusses the capabilities and

pp

limitations of atomic arid strategic air warfare, atomic
policy, and the political, psychological and morale fac
tors in war,

'The Atlantic Pact"

Hoskins ( 1949)

100

This book ·gives a brief but thorough account of the
events leaping up to the -Atlantic Pact, and also tells
why each country joined the Pact. It is complete in
citing specific speeches and doctrines, as well as in

furnishing a reproduction of the Pact itself. An ex
cellent account of U. S. foreign policy as it is today.

'"Western European Union"

Hawtrey ( 1949)

126

A . primer for the English public, setting forth the

English point of view on European Union, including

the problems with proposed solutions. The whole prob

lem is related to the Marshall Plan, military aid, and

the North Atlantic Pact. Every officer of the services
of the USA should read this in order to appreciate
the viewpoint of our main ally.

It is clearly and simply

written and the reading is easy.

"Bombing and Strategy"

Dickens ( 1946)

90

In this short book the author analyzes and criticizes

British aerial strategy (particularly strategic bomb

ing) of World War-II. Concerned primarily with the

integration of bombing and other military and naval

efforts as they affect the British Isles, it contains
much food for thought for military planners as· re-
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gards the employment of air power in a balanced

PP

fleet.

"The Bismarck Episode"

Grenfell ( 1948)

219

A detailed account of the chase and sinking of the

German battleship Bismarck.

"Summary Reports, European and Pacific Wars"

U.S.S.B.S. (1945-46)

50

In two parts., A concise report of the results obtained

by strat�gic bombing in the European and Pacific
Theaters including conclusions, lessons learned and
future trends.

"The Role of Sea Power in Global Warfare of the Future"
Rosinski
(Brassey's Naval Annual, 1947)

14

A brief article in which Dr. Rosinski develops the

thesis that sea power will continue to be a fundamental
and decisive historical force.

III. COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION
"The Art of War."

Sun Tzu

99

This is a 1944 edition of the Giles translation of one of

the greatest military classics ever written. The book

comprises thirteen short chapters. In the first. par-

. agraph Sun Tzu writes" The art of war is of vital im
portance to the state.

It

is a matter of life and death,

a road either to safety or ruin. Hence it is a subject

of inquiry-which can on no account be neglected".

From that point he proceeds to an enunciation of

the principles of war, and to an examination of

them. This is a book that should be read by every
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officer and would be a valuable addition to his personal
library.
"Makers of Modem Strategy" (Selections)

pp

Earle (1944)

This book is an outgrowth of a seminar on military
affairs which was conducted at the Institute for Ad
vanced Study. Twenty well known historians trace
the development of modern military thought in brief,
and in some casEls brilliant, studies of the contri
butions of Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, Doubet, and
Foch (among others) to current military thinking.
"Generals and Generalship"

Wavell ( 1943)

36

The qualities that a general must possess, the abilities
he must have to handle his troops, and his relationship
with the statesmen who command his activities are
ably presented by Field Marshall Wavell in this book.
"Organization, A Formul-ation of Principle"

Brown ( 1945)

308

A treatise on the basic principles of organization.
IV. ATOMIC ENERGY
"Fear, War and the Bomb"

Blackett ( 1948)

236

Professor Blackett first analyzes air power in the last
war, then the atom bomb as a weapon. With these two
studies as a premise, he proceeds to discuss the bomb's
strategic consequences. The author's background a1;1 an
atomic scientist, a former member of Great Britian's
Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy, and as a
military man, plug the carefully chosen quotations
from numerous authorities, combine to make this part
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of the book convincing. The second half of the work

PP

is devoted to the political implications of the bomb,

and here the author displays so much bias that one

naturally questions the conclusions drawn in the first
half. The book is so controversial that it probably will
be widely i:-ead.

'Must We Hide?"

Lapp (1949)

182

A short discussion of the results of the first five

A-bomb bursts. Dr. Lapp, Executive Director of the
Committee on Atomic Energy of the Research and De

velopment Board, develops the capabilities of the bomb

and demonstrates these capabilities by relating the
various types of bursts to the damage each would
produce in an American city.

''The,Efjects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki"
U.S.S.B.S. (1946)

43

A condensed but complete report on the effects of the

two bombs.

V. MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS
Fairbank (1949)
,,United States and China''

384

John King Fairbank is well qualified to write in the

field he deals with in this book. He has lived for a

number of years in China and traveled extensively
there. He is at present in charge of the China Program

at Harvard, Professor Fairbank states that his pur-

. pose is "to indicate some of the major currents which

now form the tide of social change in China" and "to

summarize the major patterns of thought and conduct,

the major political and economic forms" which·are in-
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grained in Chinese society. This purpose he accom
plishes admirably. The book should be · read by any
officer who wishes to straighten out his thinking on the
subject of our position in China, for in it Fairbank
manages to separate the wheat from the chaff, and
to present a reasoned, coherent picture· of the forces
that make China what it is.

uHow New will the.Better World be?"

Becker (194)

PP

246

A stimulating discussion of the post-war reconstruc
tion period. The author diagnoses the present state of
the world, with special attention to nationalism, sov
ereignty, power politics, and imperialism.

"How lo Think Straight"

Thouless

( 1939)

233

In direct, sprightly, nontechnical English, Professor
Thouless discusses the most effective ways of achiev
ing and maintaining a clear thinking, well-balanced
and flexible mind.
1
'

The Ari of Plain Talk"

Flesch ( 1946)

194

A book that tells how to talk plain. People whose bus
iness or desire it is to convey ideas will obtain valuable
hints on effective presentation.
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This section lists material published in current periodicals

which will be of interest and value to officers of the Navy, Marine
Corps, and Coast Guard.

"Strategy of Limited War"
By Ascoli, Schreiber, Deutscher & Hessler. The Reporter.
August 1..

"America Today; A Freehand Sketch"
By Lewis Galantiere. Foreign Affairs. July.

"Piercing the Iron Curtain"
By Lowell M. Clucas. The Yale Review. Summer 1950.

"Atomic Weapons and the Korean War"
Editorial Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. July.

"The Great Results of Korea"
By Ernest K. Lindley. Newsweek. August 7.

"Exaggerated Dangers of Germ Warfare"
American Mercury. July.

''American Policy Toward Russia"
By Quincy Wright. World Politics., July.

"The Strategy of World War Ill"
By Major-General J. F. C. Fuller and Alexander Mebane.

American Perspective. Summer, 1950.
11

Geurrilla"
Parts I and II, by Colonel Samuel

B.

Corps Gazette, July and August.

Griffith, II Marine

"We're Betting our Shirts on the Atomic Submarine."
By Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood. Saturday

Evening Post of 22 July.
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"Sofliet WM Potffllial is Rising"
U. S. News and World Report. July 14, 1950.
"Russu, Today: lls Strength, lls Weakness, Its AbilitJ to W11ge W111'
11gllimt the United Stllles"
By Richard Wilson. Look. August 15, 1950.
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